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Nearly all models proposed within the scope of the study of security protocols make perfect 
encryption assumptions. These hypotheses can be summarised as follow: 
- The decryption key must be known in order to extract the plaintext corresponding to a given 
ciphertext. 
- There is enough redundancy in the cryptosystem that a ciphertext can only be generated using 
encryption with the appropriate key and message.  
This assumption is obviously not true in practice. A first example is the one of the 
cryptosystems proceeding by cipher-block-chaining (CBC). In such systems, the encryption of 
message block sequence P1P2…Pn is C0C1C2…Cn where C0=I (Initialisation bloc) and Ci={Ci-1⊕Pi}K.  
It can be noticed that they present the following interesting particularity: 
If  C0C1C2…CiCi+1…Cn = {P1P2…PiPi+1…Pn}K  
Then  C0C1C2…Ci = {P1P2…Pi}K 
This property can be exploited (see [Boy90] or [SG92] for other instances) to flaw the 
Needham-Schroeder symmetric key authentication protocol [NS78].  This protocol intends to permit 
Alice to establish a shared secret key Kab with Bob and to obtain mutual conviction of the possession 
of the key by each other. The key is provided by a trusted server S who shares the secret keys Kas and 
Kbs with A and B respectively. This protocol can be described as follow: 
  A  S : A.B.Na 
  S  A : {Na.B.Kab.{Kab.A}Kbs}Kas 
  A  B : {Kab.A}Kbs 
  B  A : {Nb}Kab 
  A  B : {Nb-1}Kab 
Beyond other existing attacks (the most famous having been proposed in [DS81]); this 
protocol can be flawed as follow. Suppose that the message {Na.B.Kab.{Kab.A}Kbs}Kas  has ciphertext 
C0C1C2…Cn and that all components have length one block. Then {Na.B}Kas has ciphertext C0C1C2. 
But this message is of the form A might expect to receive as third message of a later session of the 
protocol where B is considered to play initiator’s role. Thus, A can be fooled into accepting the 
publicly known Na as a secret key shared with B. 
The cryptosystems using block ciphers are furthermore particularly sensitive to known-pairs 
or chosen-pairs attacks. This imposes to design protocols in order to avoid disclosure of such pairs, but 
it remains a tough problem, even for a team of experts. Recent works have been performed by S. 
Stubblebine and C. Meadows [SM00] in order to avoid such attacks by automated analysis. 
A second example is the one of the RSA cryptosystem. Indeed, this system presents a 
multiplicative structure ((m1m2)e ≡ (m1)e(m2)e ≡ c1c2 (mod n)), what is in conflict with the second part 
of the perfect encryption assumptions. This feature can be exploited in order to break the Needham 
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Schroeder public key authentication protocol in its version fixed by Lowe [Low95] (who proved that it 
was correct in a context of perfect encryption). This protocol can be described as follow: 
  A  B : {Na.A}Kb 
  B  A : {Na.Nb.B}Ka 
  A  B : {Nb}Kb 
Alice sends a first message to Bob in which she asks him to decrypt a nonce Na and to send it 
back. Bob answers in the second message and encloses with Na the nonce Nb and his identifier. Alice 
replies then with the third message in which she proves that she has been able to decrypt the nonce Nb. 
We suppose that the encryption is made with RSA using a 512 bits modulus, that the 
identifiers are 32 bits numbers, and that the nonces are 64 bits numbers. Given that we use the RSA 
for encryption (rather than for signature), no specific padding will normally be used and we assume 
that the messages will begin with a suitable number of zeros. We will also assume that a principal who 
receives a message will not check if the zeros are actually present and will only read the bits that he 
needs to end the session of the protocol. In this context, a principal C whose identifier is such that C ≡ 
1 mod 8 can attack the four principals having the identifiers A such that A2 mod 232 = C as follow: 
 α1 A  C(B) : {Na.A}Kb 
 β1 C  B : {Nc.C}Kb = ({Na.A}Kb)2 mod n (where n is the public modulus of B) 
 β2 B  C : {Nc.Nb.B}Kc 
 α2 C(B)  A : {Na.Nd.B}Ka 
 α3 A  C(B) : {Nd}Kb 
In this scenario, C intercepts the message that A sends to B, raises it to its square, and resends 
it to B (messages α1 and β1). B answers to C, what allows him to compute the value of Na. This can be 
done by noticing that1 {({Na.A}Kb)2 mod n}Kb-1 = (Na.A)2 mod n = (232*Na+A)2 mod n = 






 It can be easily checked that the identifier read by B is actually C = A2 mod 232, so B will send 
the message β2 to the intruder. Moreover, the value of Na can easily be computed from the one of Nc, 
which is the sum of the 32 most significant bits of A2, of the 64 least significant bits of twice Na*A, 
and of 232 times the 32 least significant bits of Na2, the hole token modulo 264. The choice between the 
different solutions of this equation can easily be done by recomputing the value of {Na.A}Kb for the 
various possible values of Na. Having obtained this value, C can easily finish the session α of the 
protocol. 
 We can see that a designer who, for the sake of a greater security, would increase the size of 
the used RSA modulus would in fact make such attacks easier rather than the opposite. A simple way 
to avoid them is to add redundancies in the messages before encrypting them. The experience of such 
countermeasures in the context of the protection against signature forgery shows that it is 
unfortunately very difficult to achieve if we want to avoid every multiplicative attacks. We are 
thinking for instance at the attack described by Grieu [Gri00] who shows how to produce the signature 
of a valid message given those of three others, despite the restricting rules imposed by the ISO/IEC 
9796-1 standard [ISO98].  
 The setting of efficient protections would be made much easier if we defined formal models 
taking into account the imperfections of the encryption schemes. Their checking would allow us to 
become aware of the way in which those features can be exploited, what would be helpful in order to 
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avoid such attacks. We can indeed observe that the attack presented above can be avoided by simply 
inverting the order of the nonce and the identifier in the first message since this prevents the intruder 
to foresee the value of the identifier after squaring. A variant of this attack consisting in multiplying 
the first message by a small factor encrypted would nevertheless work in a great amount of 
circumstances.  
 In this spirit, we developed a model inspired by those used in [MCJ97] or [Low98], but taking 
into account some consequences of the multiplicative structure of RSA. To that purpose, we 
introduced a new data type f representing small factors. Those factors can be used to multiply 
messages, considering the property that f*(m1.m2)=(f*m1).(f*m2) which is often effective in practice 
(the practical upper-bound for the size of these factors is in fact dependent of the studied protocol and 
of the proposed flaw). Besides, we supposed that the intruder was in possession of private keys 
corresponding to identifiers which are multiple of those of honest principals by these small factors. 
The main difficulty in the study of our model is in the modelling of the associative and 
commutative structure of the multiplication and of the distributivity property of multiplication on 
concatenation. Indeed, those properties prevent us from using “normalised derivations” of messages 
(such as in [MCJ97]) or “unique readability” axioms (such as in [FHG98]). 
In order to solve this problem, we have limited the ability of the intruder into generating 
messages by imposing him the use of only one small factor (maybe inverted of encrypted) for 
multiplication. Furthermore, we allowed him to multiply an encrypted message only by a small factor 
encrypted with the same key as the message. This last requirement was anyway necessary in order to 
keep plausible the distributivity assumption. 
Having so bounded the number of possible interpretations of the messages (and the size of the 
state space of our system at the same time), we specified our model in Promela, which is the 
specification language of the model-checker SPIN [SPH] developed at Bell-Labs since around twenty 
years. This language presents the particularity of supporting the use of the integer type with additive 
and multiplicative operators. Given that, we defined our small factor as the integer 2 and assigned 
ranges of integer values to all types of atomic messages seeing to avoid unexpected conflicts of 
interpretation (i.e. conflicts other than those related to the particular properties of intruder’s 
identifiers).  
Those light restrictions on the capabilities of the intruder combined with the particularities of 
the Promela language allowed us to test our model on the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol. Within 
a few seconds of computation, SPIN provided us two attacks similar to the one described above.  
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